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Abstract
In this article we analyse the socio-economic participation of Somali refugees in the Netherlands. Unemployment is higher
among Somalis than any other refugee or immigrant group in the Netherlands and they facemany obstacles when it comes
to social and economic participation. At the same time, they are known for having a strong transnational orientation. We
were interested to learn whether and, if so, how Somalis use their transnational networks to overcome obstacles on the
Dutch labourmarket and howboundaries around formal labourmarkets are negotiated in order to access employment and
to participate. We did so by focusing on two strategies employed to participate, namely through Somali organizations in
the Netherlands and elsewhere, and by Somalis moving to the UK. In doing so, we looked at Somalis’ ability to span bound-
aries to create opportunities. The concept of transnational networks is helpful in understanding Somalis’ daily realities,
but conceptually it does not seem to fit entirely as these networks usually only refer to connections with the ‘homeland.’
We argue that Somalis’ boundary-spanning activities move beyond national levels and involve various scales, sites, and
settings. The data we refer to are derived from focus group discussions with 66 Somali people in Amsterdam and 20 in-
terviews with experts who work with the Somali community in the Netherlands. These discussions and interviews were
held in 2013–14. We also draw on 20 interviews with Somali organizations in the Netherlands about their transnational
orientation, which were conducted between 2010 and 2013 in the context of another research project.
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1. Introduction
Many Somalis in the Netherlands find themselves in
a vulnerable position on the Dutch labour market,
which translates into the highest unemployment fig-
ures amongst immigrant and refugee groups in the
Netherlands. More than 30% are unemployed com-
pared to 15%of all non-Western immigrants (Andriessen,
Gijsberts, Huijnk, & Nicolaas, 2017). At the same time,
Somalis are known for their strong transnational orienta-
tion (Horst, 2008; Ismail, 2011) and their entrepreneurial
activities. In this article, we raise the question whether
and, if so, how transnational networks are used to over-
come obstacles on the Dutch labour market and how
this impacts their socio-economic participation. We thus
analyse Somalis’ socio-economic participation through
a transnational lens and move beyond national levels
by taking various scales, sites, and settings into account.
Networks can be formal or informal, and can have dif-
ferent qualities. In the literature, a distinction is often
made between strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973).
Strong ties are often based on connections through fam-
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ily and friends, as well as on a shared country of origin.
Weak ties are much looser and can be ties between ac-
quaintances or business relations. These weak ties are,
however, crucial in exchanging information across differ-
ent groups and binding together groups of strong ties
(i.e., networks). Networks can be helpful in facilitating
mobility (Massey et al., 1998). Migrant networks can
serve different goals, as they can be used to share in-
formation about, for example, a migration destination
or job opportunities. Upon arrival, many migrants fall
back on their networks for housing, jobs, and all sorts
of practical issues related to the country of destina-
tion. Through networks people also send money back to
their relatives at home and elsewhere, and networks can
help to facilitate onward migration (Danso, 2001; Dekker
& Engbersen, 2014; Poros, 2001; Ryan, Sales, Mary, &
Siara, 2008), just like they can facilitate initial migration.
Networks thus can be used before, during, and after mi-
gration as well as in preparation for new trajectories.
The literature on migration and networks is in
general rather positive, especially the literature that
looks into the use of networks for integration purposes.
Migrants using their own networks to find jobs is often
perceived as an efficient way of gaining employment.
A few authors, however, nuance this picture because
labour market participation through social networks of-
ten results in migrants having lower pay and a more ho-
mogenous labour market position (i.e., as lower skilled
workers). Migrants’ own networks thus often result in
less attractive jobs and working conditions (Kalter &
Kogan, 2014; McKay, 2009).
Another observation is that the literature on the role
of networks in socio-economic integration is often lim-
ited to an analysis of networks at a local and national
scale and does not take into account the transnational
dimension. When the transnational perspective is taken
into account, it is usually argued that transnationalism
limits integration (Portes, Escobar, & Arana, 2008; Snel,
Engbersen, & Leerkes, 2006). Since 2001, Western states
have increasingly questioned the political loyalty of their
immigrant residents (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). In
the Netherlands, for instance, the government opposes
dual citizenship because it deems the resulting dual loyal-
ties ofmigrants unacceptable and requires immigrants to
have citizenship of only one country. Transnational activ-
ities (e.g., sending remittances) and a continuing identifi-
cationwith the sending country or the diaspora are often
perceived as an impediment to the integration of immi-
grants into the host country. Taking into account Somalis’
strong transnational orientation, for the purpose of this
article we take a closer look at the role transnational
networks play in their socio-economic participation. We
do so by looking beyond the nation state and using
the concept of boundary spanning, that is, the ‘cross-
ing, weaving and permeating’ (Williams, 2002) of bound-
aries. These boundaries can take many forms: They can
be national borders, but also organizational, sectoral,
professional, linguistic, and cultural and political borders
(Jöns & Freytag, 2015). Examples from the literature
point to partnerships betweenuniversities and local com-
munities as institutional boundary spanning (Weerts &
Sandmann, 2010); interaction in amultidisciplinary team
as knowledge boundary spanning (Ratcheva, 2009); and
cultural and linguistic boundary spanning in a multina-
tional corporation (Barner-Rasmussen, 2017).
Central to boundary spanning are boundary
spanners—people who can work across boundaries.
Several characteristics are ascribed to these spanners:
They seem to focus on interpersonal relationships, are
entrepreneurial and innovative, act as cultural brokers,
and exhibit trust and leadership. In order to cross bound-
aries, personal mobilities and interactions are assets for
boundary spanners, since these facilitate the transfer of
ideas, knowledge, and practices (Jöns & Freytag, 2015).
In this article we argue that Somalis are bound-
ary spanners par excellence because they use their
transnational networks to cross different boundaries
for several purposes, including socio-economic participa-
tion. Recognizing the capital that is developed through
these acts of boundary spanning, also in informal ways,
would do more justice to the lived experiences of
Somali refugees, and providing greater flexibility to
enable these boundary-spanning activities would help
to strengthen the socio-economic position of Somali
refugees. Although policymakers mainly understand
socio-economic participation as a phenomenon that ex-
clusively takes place within national borders, Somalis
also participate in other spaces/sites. By showing how
socio-economic participation works from a transnational
perspective, we add another layer to the representation
of Somalis in the Netherlands as a socio-economically
weak and passive refugee group and show that a lot of
their activities take place in another realm.
In the following section we describe the method-
ological foundations of this article and provide the back-
ground to the presence of Somalis in the Netherlands,
with a special focus on their socio-economic participa-
tion in the Netherlands. We then discuss the role of their
transnational network within this participation. We end
with a discussion on the wider meaning of these findings
concerning the role of transnational networks in socio-
economic participation.
2. Methodology
This contribution draws upon qualitative data collected
in two research projects. The first study focused on the in-
tegration position of Somalis in Amsterdam and formed
part of a larger European study on Somalis in European
cities (Open Society Foundations, 2014). The second
project investigated Somali diaspora organizations in the
Netherlands and their transnational activities. Data for
the first study were collected in 2013–14 through ten fo-
cus group discussions (FGDs) with Somalis in Amsterdam
and interviews with stakeholders in Amsterdam and else-
where. Some FGDs had a broad design, discussing multi-
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ple topics, while others had a more thematic focus, ad-
dressing education, employment, health, policing and se-
curity, and so on. The intention was to engage partici-
pants from a wide variety of backgrounds, and in par-
ticular a balance between women and men, different
age groups, and different levels of education. Some of
these criteria appeared difficult tomeet, such as an equal
representation of both genders in one FGD. Both men
and women talked more openly when they participated
in a group with people of the same sex. As such, this
article provides more room to FGDs that involved only
men or women. Another condition was that participants
should not know each other. Since the Somali popula-
tion in Amsterdam is very small this was difficult to ac-
complish. By using multiple entry points to this commu-
nity, the Somalis who participated in the FGDs repre-
sented the broad diversity within the Somali community
in Amsterdam. Most group discussions were conducted
in Somali except for those with young Somalis and a
group of older Somalis who have lived in Amsterdam
since the early 1990s. All FGDs were recorded and tran-
scribed by two Somali research assistants (Open Society
Foundations, 2014).
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of some of the ba-
sic characteristics of the participants in the FGDs. About
40% were women, and a majority of all participants had
arrived in the Netherlands after 2005. A majority of the
participants were relatively young (i.e., in their twenties
or thirties), which is a fair reflection of the presumed age
distribution of the Somali population in Amsterdam.
In addition, 23 interviews were conducted with key
individuals, such as city officials working in relevant de-
partments, leaders of Somali organizations, representa-
tives of non-governmental organizations working in rele-
vant fields, journalists, and policy officers working in the
national government.
For the second study, which was conducted in
2010–13, we started by mapping Somali organizations in
the Netherlands. We then selected the 20 most impor-
tant organizations and interviewed their boards. The top-
ics addressed included the aims of the organization, the
characteristics of their activities in the Netherlands, in
Somalia and elsewhere, and their views on development
in Somalia.
3. The Somali Diaspora
Somalis who left their country as asylum seekers are
spread over the globe. Many have family members and
relatives all over theworld. The largest Somali diaspora is
in America. Minneapolis—which is sometimes called ‘lit-
tle Mogadishu’—hosts the largest group of Somalis out-
side Somalia (Horst, 2007). The second largest Somali di-
aspora is in the UK. There is a strong tie between the
two countries as a result of the colonial past and their
common language. Migration has been taking place be-
tween Somalia and the UK since the 19th century. This
migration started with seamen and steel workers who
stayed on in the UK after doing temporary work during
the colonial period (Griffiths, 2002; Kleist, 2004). As a re-
sult of this history, many Somalis in the UK live in har-
bour cities such as London, Liverpool, Bristol, or Cardiff,
and in industrial cities such as Birmingham. Later, Somalis
fleeing the civil war in Somalia in 1991 sought asylum in
the UK. Yet later, a wave of European Somalis migrated
from the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries (Bang
Nielsen, 2004; Fangen, 2006) to the UK as EU citizens.
These Somalis sometimes arrived in cities like Leicester
that had large Muslim communities but no specific rela-
tion to Somali migration (van Liempt, 2011).
Although the Somali diaspora is geographically
spread, they are psychologically and emotionally
very much oriented towards Somalia. Research in
the Netherlands showed that 84% of the Somalis in
the Netherlands feel strongly attached to Somalia
(Andriessen et al., 2017). A large number of remittances
are sent to Somalia and there are numerous projects in
the Netherlands aimed at the development of Somalia.
The high frequency of visits to Somalia by Somalis from
the diaspora and the number of people who follow the
daily news in Somalia also evidence this strong orienta-
tion towards the homeland. Many Somalis send money
home, as explained by one of the leaders of a Somali
development organization:
There is a huge difference between transnational de-
velopment activities and remittances: Remittances
are not development activities; they are compulsory,
a moral obligation. People always feel the pressure.
You get phone calls every day, SMS: ‘When will you
Table 1. Study 1: Participants in FGDs according to gender and year of arrival in the Netherlands.
Before 1995 1995–99 2000–04 After 2005 Born in the Netherlands
Male (N = 39) 9 3 1 21 5
Female (N = 27) 2 3 3 18 1
Table 2. Study 2: Age of participants in FGDs.
Under 20 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s Unknown
4 26 16 11 5 1 3
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send money?’ The vast majority of Somalis in the
Netherlands are not involved in development activi-
ties, in structural activities. No, they just remit.
Of the roughly 40,000 Somalis in the Netherlands (on
1 January 2019 there were 39.947 Somalis registered;
see CBS, 2019) one third were born in the Netherlands.
Most Somalis live in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Tilburg, or
the Hague, although many of them first lived in other
parts of the country as a result of the Dutch dispersal pol-
icy. Research shows that only one third of Somalis still
live at the addresses they were originally dispersed to.
The rest havemoved on (van den Tillaart, 2000) to access
job opportunities and/or be closer to friends and family.
This is also in line with the study by Zorlu and Mulder
(2008), who pointed out that over time some of the dis-
persed refugees regroup in larger cities.
The Somali community in the Netherlands is usually
categorized into two groups, namely Somaliswho arrived
at the start of the 1990s, right after the collapse of the
regime of Siad Barre, and those who came from 2007 on-
wards. The contrast between the two groups is big. The
first group is mainly from the north and from urban ar-
eas and is relatively well educated (diplomats and busi-
nessmen, many with a university background). The sec-
ond group is younger andmainly consists of people from
the south, the majority from Mogadishu (Moors, van
den Reek-Vermeulen, & Siesling, 2009). This group is less
well educated and until they came to the Netherlands,
most of them had lived all their lives in a country at war.
These Somalis have not had the same opportunities as
the first group to, for example, attend school. Since 2007,
there has been a low but steady inflow of Somalis into
the Netherlands.
4. Socio-Economic Participation of Somalis in the
Netherlands
The economic participation of refugees is not straight-
forward and in general does not evolve smoothly (see
e.g., de Vroome & van Tubergen, 2010). In 2013, only
46% of all refugees had a job and, in many instances,
this was a part-time job without a fixed contract
(VluchtelingenWerk, 2014). The situation of Somalis is
worrisome. For example, in 2016, only 34% of Somali
men were employed; for Somali women, the figure was
13%. In addition, 54% of Somali men depended on wel-
fare in 2016; for Somali women, the figure was 71%
(CBS, 2018).
Figure 1 shows that unemployment is the highest
compared to any other refugee or immigrant group
in the Netherlands. In 2016, 34% of Somalis were
unemployed—twice as many as other non-Western
immigrants.
In addition to showing how Somalis’ unemployment
figures differ from those of non-Western immigrants and
autochthonous people, Figure 1 also shows that Somalis’
unemployment has been hit hard by the economic reces-
sion that started in 2008, which can be explained by the
vulnerable and often temporary jobs Somalis have in the
Netherlands. Only a third of Somalis who work have per-
manent jobs; the rest work part time and often without
fixed contracts (Andriessen et al., 2017). They also earn
very little and with the possibility of receiving benefits
there is not much incentive to stay in precarious and low
paid jobs. During one of the FGDs, a 45-year-old man
pointed out how he thought the welfare system in the
Netherlands was unfair:
I do not think the system is fair. I work 40 hours per
week, get up at 5.30 every day, spend eight hours in a
noisy factory, and return home tired. For all this, I re-
ceive €1,200 everymonth.My Somali friend here gets
up at 10, watches television all day, and receives only
€100 less.
Apart from precarious jobs, low pay, and the possibil-
ity of receiving benefits in the Netherlands, the litera-
ture also points out that the relatively high levels of un-
employment among Somalis can be explained by the
‘refugee gap’ (Connor, 2010). The educational and job
careers of most Somali refugees have been interrupted
by war and their escape from it. This is aggravated by
specific context-related issues. Dutch asylum and integra-
tion policies do not allow asylum seekers to work when
they first arrive, and then later on force them to inte-
grate quickly. The asylum process and the long waiting
times have often made this gap bigger (Engbersen et al.,
2015). Difficulties getting diplomas certified or recog-
nized can result in the gap never being completely closed.
Moreover, Somalis face double discrimination on the
labour market because they are both black and Muslim.
The language barrier and a lack of knowledge about
how the labour market works in Europe also makes it
hard for Somalis to find their way on the Dutch labour
market. Especially, the recent arrivals with lower educa-
tional levels are struggling to learn Dutch (deWaal, 2017;
Open Society Foundations, 2014), which makes it more
difficult to participate socially and economically. Many
Somalis feel caught in a vicious circle: Because they do
not speak Dutch well, it is hard to find a job, and because
they do not work, it is hard to improve their Dutch.
The way refugees can use their social capital dif-
fers from the way other people can use theirs be-
cause refugees’ networks often consist of people who
also have little knowledge of the Dutch labour mar-
ket and often lack connections that can improve socio-
economic integration. Van Tubergen (2011) found that
jobless refugees in the Netherlands often seek work
through employment agencies rather than through
families or friends. This could be because refugees’
co-ethnics are also not so well connected to the
Dutch labour market and that refugees have few con-
tacts outside their co-ethnic networks. Some of the
Somalis in the Netherlands, especially the older and
the lower educated ones, have networks that consist
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Figure 1.Unemployment figures for Somalis, autochthonous people and non-Western total, in theNetherlands 2003–2016,
in percentages (based on Andriessen et al., 2017).
mainly of other Somalis. The same applies to women
with young children, because they mostly interact with
other Somali women (Open Society Foundations, 2014).
Young Somalis have the most diverse social networks
(Andriessen et al., 2017). There are also differences be-
tween the first and second group of arrivals; for exam-
ple, the ‘newcomers’ seem to interact more exclusively
with other Somalis compared to thosewho arrived in the
1990s. However, transnational networks play an impor-
tant role in the lives of all Somalis in the Netherlands.
Many, for example, have connections to Somalis in the
UK, which sometimes makes it easier to find a job in the
UK than in the Netherlands. The head of a Somali or-
ganization explained to us how in the mid-2000s, many
Somali men moved to the UK to find work:
In 2005 we started IFTIN [Stichting Somalische
vrouwen Amsterdam en Omstreken—Somali Women
in Amsterdam and the Surroundings Foundation]. At
that time, a lot of Somali families were leaving for
the United Kingdom. Most of the time, the man—the
provider of the family—went first. These men were
highly educated and not satisfied with their situation;
living on benefits was not why they had come to
the Netherlands.
Size alsomatters. Refugees are a small and relatively new
community, which means that people are dependent on
small networks. The networks of refugees are thus often
less equipped to support socio-economic participation
at the local level in the new place of arrival. Their net-
works are also often relatively small as a result of migra-
tion and dispersal.
The unemployment figures show that there are quite
substantial differences within the group of Somalis (as
mentioned, in 2016, 34%of themenhad a job,while only
13% of the women had one; CBS, 2018). Somali women
are less oriented towards the Dutch labour market and
more oriented towards their families than men, because
most of them have caring obligations (Pels & de Gruijter,
2005). Our interviews show that somewomen encounter
barriers when it comes to childcare possibilities, which
makes it less easy to work. Some Somali women want to
work but do not know how to arrange it in a situation
where they are the only one responsible and their local
network is too weak. For example, a 28-year-old Somali
woman we interviewed said:
I would like to work, but I am a single mother. Who
will take care of my kids? That is the problem. For a
Dutchmother, it is not so hard towork, evenwhen she
has three kids. She has a safety net of grandmothers,
neighbours and friends who can take care of her kids.
Somali women do not have these safety nets when
they arrive in the Netherlands.
Here we see that transnational networks can be useful
for advice and support, but they cannot be used for prac-
tical matters such as daily childcare support, which can
be an obstacle to finding a job and thus to the socio-
economic participation of Somali women.
Discrimination on the Dutch labour market also
needs to be looked into when trying to explain the high
levels of unemployment amongst Somalis. The Somalis
we interviewed told us that sometimes the employment
agency explicitly stated that certain jobs were not meant
for them—even in the case of lower skilled jobs. One 32-
year-old Somali man explained how he had been discour-
aged from applying for a job as a rubbish collector:
I wanted to apply for a job as a rubbish collector. But
they told me that this was a job for which you need
Dutch citizenship. I told them no problem, I’m Dutch.
Well, he said, I am sorry but you cannot get this job.
Many interviewees said that the reasons they had been
given for not getting a certain job, or not even being al-
lowed to apply for it, were unclear and unjust.
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Finally, it is known that mental health problems
and daily stress, and worrying about relatives who are
still in a war zone or are trying to escape from one,
can make it difficult for refugees to participate in so-
ciety in general (Bakker, 2016; Dourleijn & Dagevos,
2011; Engbersen et al., 2015; Maliepaard, Witkamp, &
Jennissen, 2017). As a result of the high unemployment
rate in the Netherlands and the difficulties that Somalis
encounter when trying to find jobs, a large number of
Somalis live on benefits (Andriessen et al., 2017): In 2015,
for example, 52% of Somalis aged between 15 and 65
years received social security benefits. The majority of
those receiving benefits were women or people aged 45
or over—a worrisome situation. On the other hand, we
see an increase in the number of people doing ‘voluntary’
jobs (Andriessen et al., 2017), which might be an indica-
tion that they find alternative ways to participate in the
labour market.
Studies on Somalis point out that they have very
strong transnational orientations. From research we
know that these networks are important for social,
cultural, and political reasons (Bang Nielsen, 2004;
Hammond, 2015; Horst, 2006), but we do not know
much about what these networks actually do or mean
in the context of economic participation, or whether
they impede or support the participation of Somalis in
host societies. In the following section, we explore two
forms of socio-economic participation of Somalis in the
Netherlands that are facilitated by Somali transnational
networks, namely working for Somali organizations in
the Netherlands that are focused on developing Somalia,
and moving to the UK from the Netherlands to work as
an entrepreneur. We opted for these two forms of socio-
economic participation as they clearly reflect the use of
transnational networks.
5. Making a Job out of Participation in Somali
Organizations
One way of participating socio-economically in the
Netherlands by using Somalis’ transnational networks
is to make a job out of social, cultural, and politi-
cal activities organized by Somali organizations in the
Netherlands. There are around 160 active Somali or-
ganizations in the Netherlands (van Heelsum, 2011),
mostly in the Randstad area. The organizational den-
sity amongst Somalis is very high as a result of the
Dutch dispersal policy and also because of the clan struc-
ture (van Heelsum, 2011) and the high levels of mis-
trust among Somalis and the resulting lack of collabo-
ration between the different groups. Another explana-
tion for the high number of diverse organizations is the
heterogeneity in their agendas: They all have different
missions and very different scopes of orientation (Open
Society Foundations, 2014). Somali organizations in the
Netherlands can generally be divided into two groups.
One group offers local support to help Somalis integrate
themselves into the Netherlands. Examples of such orga-
nizations are Dalmar, SOMVAO, and the umbrella organi-
zation FSAN. They offer practical support to the Somali
community like conversation classes, support for stu-
dents with finding internships, and various sorts of in-
formation events. The other group is made up of orga-
nizations mainly orientated towards Somalia. They work
around topics such as female genital mutilation, health-
care, peacebuilding, and social and economic develop-
ment in Somalia. Examples of such organizations are
HIRDA and NedSom.
Both types of organizations provide important ‘par-
ticipation spaces’ for Somalis in the Netherlands, as they
offer both voluntary and paid jobs. Of the 20 organiza-
tions we interviewed, five had paid staff. It should be
noted that paid staff often have temporary part-time
jobs that are strongly dependent on outside funding,
which may come from the local or national government
in the context of civic integration, for example an organi-
zation subcontracted by a municipality to provide train-
ing, or for projects in the field of international devel-
opment, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or de-
velopment NGOs. In the period 2004–2010, the Dutch
government actively promoted diaspora engagement in
development cooperation through migration and devel-
opment policies. The underlying rationale was that mi-
grants with knowledge of the area and linguistic capaci-
ties would have added value as experts in development
cooperation programmes. These co-development pro-
grammes consisted of matching funds, capacity build-
ing, and temporary deployment schemes (Frouws &
Grimmius, 2012; Nijenhuis & Broekhuis, 2010). Somali
organizations were eligible for funding, and at least four
of the organizations we interviewed had managed to ac-
cess some of these co-development funds. The impor-
tance of such funds is in line with the findings of Moret
(2018, p. 163), who points out how one of her inter-
viewees participated in the Netherlands in the found-
ing of an NGO with a strong transnational orientation
towards Somaliland and the objective of rebuilding so-
cial infrastructure there, with financial support from the
Ministry. Upon her relocation to the UK, she founded a
UK branch of this organization. Interestingly, one of her
respondents mentioned that she regularly returns to the
Netherlands, as it is easier to get funding there. This il-
lustrates the importance of transnational networks and
the boundary-spanning capacities of Somalis engaged
in these organizations. Notwithstanding the presence of
funding opportunities, these jobs are also vulnerable as
they aremostly temporary and highly dependent on sub-
sidiary frameworks, which are becoming more transna-
tional and competitive. Some of our interviewees said
that it is becomingmore difficult for Somali organizations
in the Netherlands to get funding, because there is less
national funding available and at the European level one
now needs to competewith European partners with very
impressive track records.
Three quarters of the organizations interviewed re-
ceived support from between three and over 300 volun-
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teers. These volunteers are indispensable for the organi-
zations, in terms of labour and network, as the following
quote illustrates:
Many of our projects could not be carried out with-
out the help of our volunteers. We have a pool of
some 30, 35 people who provide support in a more
structural way—in fundraising, the practical organiza-
tion of events, or giving presentations at secondary
schools. They have their ownexpertise. Oneof our vol-
unteers was trained as a controller in an educational
institution, so he helps us with financial issues. (Chair
of a Somali organization, Amsterdam)
Although Somali organizations in theNetherlands that fo-
cus on Somalia have philanthropical motives, some vol-
unteers expect and hope that their activities will result
in economic gain. They regard this type of volunteering
often as an investment in their future as well and some
talk about these transnational activities in terms of ‘ex-
ploring a possible return,’ framed by Sagmo (2015) as a
‘return assessment.’ As one respondent,who runs a small
charity, remarked:
We do small projects in Somalia, and it is mostly our
local partners who do the actual implementation. But
I go twice a year as well, to talk with people at the
Ministry and with NGOs. Actually, it is not only to ex-
plore opportunities now, but also to explore options
for the future, as I might go back to Somalia. (Male
respondent, 2011)
This finding is in line with the observations of Sagmo
(2015, p. 657) in her study on return visits by Burundian
migrants living in the UK and Norway. She argues that
regular visits are deemed important when migrants are
planning a more permanent return. In order to make
such a return, they need to secure economic capital
and return visits are used to explore ‘niches’ in the mar-
ket that might be used to set up a business. Other au-
thors also refer to economic motives, in terms of em-
ployment and job creation, to establish or become en-
gaged in a migrant organization (Griffiths, 2000; Open
Society Foundations, 2014). Idil Osman (2017) also de-
scribes how the Somali diaspora elite saw opportunities
and possibilities for themselves in Somalia during elec-
tion time, and travelled back and forth constantly be-
tween the UK and Somalia to network and lobby—a phe-
nomenon also observed byHammond (2015). During our
fieldwork we too observed this, with people going to and
from to Somalia on a regular basis. Such ‘pendular mo-
bility’ is also mentioned by Moret (2018, p. 167), who
describes how interviewees who run a Somali organiza-
tion can be characterized by transnational living. They
frequently travel to Somalia, building social and cultural
capital in such a way that they might be able to get a job
in this field. In short, they intend to validate their capitals,
making use of their transnational assets, namely their
exposure to the ‘West’ and their networks and linguis-
tic and cultural skills related to their Somali background
(Hansen, 2014; Kleist, 2007). Having citizenship in the
Netherlands enables a mobile livelihood strategy, and
the large majority of the migrant organizations we inter-
viewed considered citizenship a prerequisite to running
the organization.
Somali organizations in theNetherlands that focus on
Somalia use their networks in different ways. Strong ties,
like family, where trust plays an important role, are used
to ensure that local projects are run properly. For exam-
ple, they function as a local entry point where containers
of goods can arrive, local people can be paid and prob-
lems can be solved:
In Somaliland we work with a guy we’ve known for a
very long time. A fewyears ago, he returned, and since
thenwe contract him for projects, to hire construction
workers for example and to oversee the work. So, in a
way, we also create jobs. (Board member of a Somali
organization, the Hague)
The weaker ties—such as contacts with other develop-
ment organizations, ministries and coalition partners—
are important for sharing information about, for exam-
ple, funding opportunities. Somalis thus use their human
capital, in the form of knowledge and contacts, to im-
prove their own economic situations.
Boundary spanning is essential in this case for mak-
ing the activities of these organizations a success. Those
who run these organizations often have traits that are
commonly ascribed to boundary spanners. They speak
Dutchwith ease, have knowledge of Dutch and European
funding opportunities, and know how to access net-
works at different levels to raise money. They also have
strong and weak connections in Somalia that make all of
this possible.
6. Becoming a Self-Employed Entrepreneur in the UK
Around the year 2000, many Somalis started to leave the
Netherlands to try their luck in the UK (van den Reek &
Hussein, 2003; van Liempt, 2011). Research has shown
that there aremany explanatory factors behind this, such
as reuniting with the larger Somali diaspora for social
and cultural reasons. But economic considerations also
played an important role:Many Somalis were unsatisfied
with their economic position in Dutch society and frus-
trated that their skills were not recognized. The language
barrier also played a role in some decisions to move to
the UK, where there were better job prospects.
The UK was assumed to be a country where it is eas-
ier to start your own business. In the Netherlands, many
Somalis want to start a business, but most do not suc-
ceed or even start because of regulations and other ob-
stacles. In the Netherlands it is important to have certifi-
cates, which makes it harder to start a business if you
are from another country. There are also regulations and
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formal requirements, such as permits, that are not easy
to understand—especially if you are not fluent in Dutch.
Dagevos and Odé showed that, in 2008, less than 1% of
Somalis were registered as self-employed entrepreneurs
(Dagevos&Odé, 2011). This figure has recently increased
a little, but at the turn of the century it was very low.
In the UK there is a longer history of family-run shops.
Such shops are dependent on cheap and sometimes
free labour provided by family members and friends
(Theodorakopoulos & Ram, 2007). Most Somali shops
run by Dutch Somalis in the UK are family run. It was dis-
cussed in the FGDs how much easier it is to enter the
system in the UK and that one does not always need
certificates to set up a business. As such, there is more
space for boundary spanning between formal and infor-
mal aspects of labour participation. The UK system is
perceived as rewarding experience rather than focusing
on the possession of certificates, which is what Somalis
experience in the Dutch system (see also Momatrade
Consultancy, 2004).
This shows that the transnational networks of
Dutch Somalis extend beyond connections between the
Netherlands and Somalia (Moret, 2016; Open Society
Foundations, 2014) and involve other countries and
specific cities and even specific connections to Somali
entrepreneurs.
Many of the Somalis who left the Netherlands to set-
tle in theUK perceived starting a business as an attractive
alternative to formal employment. We argue that those
whomoved to theUK to start a business can be conceptu-
alized as boundary spanners, because they found a way
to overcome obstacles on the Dutch formal labour mar-
ket by making use of their own networks in innovative
ways and moving beyond the national market that they
were supposed to integrate into. Many already knew
somebody who ran a business in the UK. Through them
they had heard that the rules and regulations around
starting a business in the UK were less strict than in the
Netherlands (Klaver, Poel, & Stouten, 2010; Open Society
Foundations, 2014; van den Reek & Hussein, 2003). With
this specific access to local knowledge and networks,
they can be seen as cultural and institutional brokers.
Dutch Somalis’ alternative economic strategies that span
national borders and involve transnational economic ac-
tivities fit very well with Williams’s (2002) description
of boundary spanners as entrepreneurial and innovative.
Their willingness tomove is fundamental to their stretch-
ing of the labour market.
7. Conclusion
Somalis receive a lot of attention in the media and from
policymakers in the Netherlands and elsewhere, often
for negative reasons. Because they have a higher un-
employment rate than any other refugee group, it is of-
ten argued that their prospects are poor. Our research
shows that Somalis indeed face many difficulties access-
ing the Dutch formal labour market, because they lack
human and social capital and suffer from mental health
problems and discrimination. However, in this article we
showed that Somalis also actively use their transnational
networks to participate socio-economically. The labour
markets in which they participate are, however, not al-
ways fixed to national territories and they do not always
start in the formal paid sector. We found that outside for-
mal channels, Somalis sometimes manage to find job op-
portunities, either through voluntary or self-created jobs,
for example in the context of Somali organizations in the
Netherlands or on the margins of the British labour mar-
ket, where it is easier to bend the rules and regulations
and start a small business and become self-employed.
A broader type of participation needs to be included
in the definition of ‘participation’ to understand the real
participation of Somalis. Dagevos (1998) has called these
jobs ‘ethnic functions’—often jobs that are not paid but
are very important in initiating participation in a new
labour market. Funding structures for self-organizations
used to be supportive of these types of jobs, but they
are currently under pressure because of budget cuts.
What is important to point out, however, is that these
boundary-spanning activities between paid and volun-
tary jobs also move beyond national borders. In the case
of Dutch Somalis, the UK is an important labour mar-
ket and Somalis use their connections in the UK to in-
crease their opportunities to participate economically
there, mostly by starting a business, but also in Somalia
there are opportunities for Somalis from theNetherlands
to create jobs. Through our interviews we found that
some Somalis in the Netherlands are actively orienting
themselves towards Somalia, trying to create jobs and/or
seeking future opportunities for jobs there.
Participation is generally only recognized when it
takes place within national borders and in formal labour
markets. To do justice to the transnational lives of
Somalis—as illustrated by those who are involved in
Somali organizations that span different contexts—and
also to acknowledge the contribution to socio-economic
participation that may potentially move across bor-
ders, it would make a difference if such manifestations
of participation were valued for refugees in the fu-
ture. Recognizing and accepting that transnationalism
is a feature through which Somali refugees’ daily lives
and commitments—and thus also their socio-economic
participation—takes place is important, as it also plays a
crucial role in the way they belong to society.When liveli-
hoods are transnational, commitments are more fluid
and various boundaries need to be spanned.
Both forms of socio-economic participation we ex-
plored in this article show the important role of boundary
spanners and their specific features: These are people
who are able to cross boundaries through their personal
mobilities and assets. These assets could be framed as
capital, resources that can be used to improve their eco-
nomic position (Moret, 2016). In the words of Williams
(2007), Somalis access ‘external knowledge, interpret it
and refine it, adapting it to their specific context.’ It
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 264–274 271
should be noted that the role of the Dutch passport in
this case is crucial, as it plays an essential role in giving
Somalis access to both the Somali and the EU labourmar-
ket, and in expanding their opportunities. Being more
open to less formal and unpaid types of economic activi-
ties will be important in gaining recognition of the partic-
ipation of Somali boundary spanners.
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